Kevin Pelton on Sloan
We'll be Wingcasting later this week but, in the meantime, check out KP2's summary report from Sloan. Click here for his full wrap that includes a number of nice tidbits...
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I thought one of Cuban's more interesting points was when he said that statistical analysis was more helpful at the bottom of the roster. This makes sense, since there tends to be agreement between the numbers and scouting on the truly good players but more discrepancies further down the talent distribution.
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If you missed my Sloan story yesterday, click here.
-- Ben Golliver | benjamin.golliver@gmail.com | Twitter
almost 2 years ago
Ben Golliver
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I wonder which numbers insinuated to Cuban that Eduardo Najera would be a better player than Kris Humphries for the Mavs – now or in the future. Probably the numbers he had to write on the paychecks of Shawne Williams, who he packaged with Humphries to get rid of him asap after already spending 2 second round picks on him.
On the other hand, his numbers on Beaubois must have been better than the numbers Sam Presti looked at, and rightly so.
I was surprised to see that Nate Silvers was involved at all.
But that’s how much I know. I am not a stats guy, although occasionally an anomalous statoid does make me perk up and take note. So, for me, Nate Silvers is the guy who called pretty much all of the election results of November, 2009. I don’t know diddly about his baseball stuff.
I do know that I would be more in the camp of those who rely on gut feelings. (Yes, I’m aware that this seems to put me into some kind of crazy alliance with GWB.) However, I lived in Berkeley and followed the Oakland A’s intensively for a number of years while Tony La Russa managed the team — a team that included Jose Canseco, Mark McGwire, Ricky Henderson, and many more greats. It’s tought to argue with the success that La Russa had with that team, but I was always annoyed when he would pull a hot batter or pitcher for a theoretical situational advantage; e.g., a lefty batter was statistically more likely to hit off this particular opposing reliever. He didn’t seem to believe in the concept of clutchiness, nor even that a given player might just be hot at the moment. He would take out a starting pitcher after a certain number of pitches even if the guy was striking out the opposition.
Hmmm. Who does that remind me of???
#52
Interesting that Pritchard felt stats were more useful for personnel
While Cuban thought it more useful for coaching. It might just be a question of perspective, but I wonder what it might mean in relation to Nate’s coaching style, e.g., LMA’s 20 footers, 4th quarter iso offense, etc.
by Epimenides on Mar 11, 2010 6:19 AM PST via mobile reply actions
I want to hear more about the Football Outsiders stuff
Aaron Schatz is often on Bill Simmons’ podcast and he’s often wrong (listen to the one before the Pats-Giants Super Bowl), and then he always has an excuse in the next podcast as to why he was wrong.
With Schatz, I don’t know if his numbers are wrong, just the analysis and the conclusions he reaches from his numbers.




















