Gametape Breakdown: Down the Stretch in Philly
Last week I took a look at some of the late-game execution breakdowns on both ends of the floor that led to Portland's loss to the Cleveland Cavaliers. To summarize briefly: the Blazers struggled to handle an isolated LeBron James, who passed the Blazers to death, and they struggled to free Brandon Roy on offense, as the Cavaliers regularly doubled Roy and rendered him ineffective down the stretch.
On Wednesday, the Blazers were able to defeat the Philadelphia 76ers, out-executing their opponent down the stretch despite playing without an injured Brandon Roy during the second half. As the Blazers late-game offense is notorious for relying on Roy almost exclusively, it was fascinating to watch the team deal with his absence.
Much like the Cleveland game, the Blazers entered the last six minutes of Wednesday's game in a dogfight: the score was Blazers 81-79 with 6 minutes to play. Either team could take this game. Nate McMillan had found success with three players: LaMarcus Aldridge (finished with 23 points), Jerryd Bayless (18 points) and Andre Miller (24 points). The Blazer guards had also done a nice job of drawing fouls and hitting their foul shots. The Philly defense, one of the league's worst, was active and gambling but hadn't looked truly committed all night.
If there was one major complaint from the Cleveland game, it was LaMarcus Aldridge's lack of involvement in the team's offensive sets down the stretch. Nate McMillan rectified that issue pretty thoroughly on Wednesday, regularly using Aldridge as his pick-setter and even running an isolation play for him. Let's break down the final six minutes of the Blazers offense to take a look at what worked, what didn't work and what it all means going forward.
Play by Play
First, take a look at this play: a high pick and roll play with Jerryd Bayless as the ballhandler and LaMarcus Aldridge as the pick-setter. As Philadelphia has the decrepit Allen Iverson matched up with the much younger Bayless, their team defense is forced to respect Bayless's ability to drive to the basket. Much like in the Cleveland game, you can see Philadelphia cheating hard off of Andre Miller in the corner. Otherwise, Philly is playing this straight up -- Iguodala is sticking closely to Rudy Fernandez on the weak side, respecting his shot -- and it becomes simple two man basketball.
Fast-forward a few seconds and here's the result. Bayless uses the pick effectively and crosses over to the right, causing Philly big man Samuel Dalembert to attempt the impossible by tracking Bayless on the perimeter. Dalembert's footwork took himself out of the play, really, as Bayless makes the correct, timely read and hits Aldridge, who fades to the open space. Philly defender Jrue Holiday, a rookie, is left with the decision of rotating to Aldridge and leaving Miller completely unguarded in the corner or letting Aldridge take an uncontested face-up shot. He doesn't really make a clear decision and, in this case, his indecision became a decision: Aldridge was left unguarded long enough to stroke an uncontested 18 footer.
All in all a relatively simple play. In the course of this game, however, it was an important one because Bayless's correct read and Aldridge's ensuing make helped open up Philly's defense and forced them to consider adjustments.
The very next trip down, the Blazers again went to a high pick and roll with Bayless and Aldridge. Here's a look. Having just been burned by the pass, Iverson and Dalembert are paying extra attention to the pick side. Iverson set up his body to fight over the pick and Dalembert is in close contact with Aldridge, ready to show on Bayless if necessary but also looking to keep contact with Aldridge should he fade for another jumper attempt. Instinctively, Bayless reads the defense and simply ignores the pick, escaping to the space in the lane vacated by Dalembert's presence up top.
Before you know it, here's the result: an open, made floater by Bayless in the key. You can see Iverson trailing Bayless and not really impacting this play meaningfully. Dalembert doesn't really know what just happened. Iguodala again remains tight on Fernandez. The weakside collapse from Holiday doesn't impact the shot because he has too far to go. Elton Brand did a sufficient job stepping up on Bayless and forcing the floater. Had Brand rotated a step sooner he would have likely forced Bayless to pass to an open Juwan Howard on the baseline, who can stick that 8 foot shot. Brand was a step slower, though, and Bayless made Philly pay.
At this point, Philly realizes that it can no longer afford to allow the Blazers to exploit the perimeter defense liability that is Allen Iverson. The Blazers have shown they can exploit him in multiple ways on the pick and roll, neither of which was particularly complicated. An adjustment is necessary. Philly's decision? Go to a zone.
Here's a great look at Portland's initial reaction to the zone: total confusion. Both Juwan Howard and LaMarcus Aldridge set ineffective high picks before realizing that Philly's guards weren't going to fight through them and Dalembert wasn't going to vacate the lane. You can almost see the wheels turning in Bayless's head as he slowly processes his potential counterattacks. Option one, in his mind, is to drive (as always) but attacking the zone directly can often lead to trouble. What Andre Miller soon notices is that Philly's zone relies on Elton Brand (a Power Forward) to guard Miller (a point guard) on the weakside. Clearly this is a huge mismatch.
It's unclear whether Bayless realizes this fact on his own or because Miller makes sure he realizes it. Either way, the recognition comes (better late than never), Howard clears out of the way and Bayless finds Miller. As I mentioned in the Cleveland post, when a team hard doubles or zones on the perimeter two quick passes should lead to an easy shot. This possession is not only the quintessential example of that adage, it was also the game's best highlight. Take a look. Miller immediately re-routes Bayless's pass to a cutting Rudy Fernandez, who beautifully recognizes that LaMarcus Aldridge will be wide open on the backside. Rudy flipped a pass to a cutting Aldridge who was fouled by a rotating-too-late Holiday yet still managed to finish the and-one.
Philly's zone succeeded in taking the ball out of Bayless's hands but it broke down pretty quickly thanks to some aggressive passing. Going to zone had been a calculated risk. Through the first 15 seconds or so of the shot clock it seemed like a smart decision. Two passes later and Philly's defenders were hanging their heads, looking defeated as they lined up for the free throw.
Soon after, Philly scrapped its zone. After unsuccessfully going to LaMarcus on an isolation in the post that resulted in a turnover, McMillan reverted again to what had worked before: Bayless/Aldridge pick and roll. Here's a look. This time, the pick is set up on the left side, leaving more room for Aldridge to fade into the corner without worrying about a rotating defender. Bayless doesn't run Iverson off the pick as closely as you might like but Iverson trails hopelessly anyway, forcing Dalembert to show hard again. Bayless makes the easy read again, finding Aldridge for a wide open spot up jumper, which he missed.
Here's a look at the end of the play. This is where the talk radio callers go crazy. "Stop shooting jumpers!!! Take it inside!!!! Be a man!!!! Chew tobacco like I do!!!! Have 20 kids out of wedlock to prove your masculinity!!! Drink a rack of Coors and run into a wall, videotaping the antics and uploading them on youtube using the screenname 'YChromosomeBoyyy'!!!!" Putting aside the fact that Aldridge just hit a similar shot roughly 5 possessions before, a glance at Synergy's numbers (courtesy of the Invisible Ninja) shows that Aldridge shot 48.2% on face-up jumpers through the first 41 games of the season. That's a legit weapon, even if contested. In this case, Aldridge was't contested as Elton Brand had too far to rotate to really bother the shot. Perhaps a pump fake, dribble left and shot would have increased his percentages, but that's mostly nit-picking.
With the personnel the Blazers have on the court at that point, they can do far worse than an uncontested jumper from Aldridge, especially one that isn't taken late in the shot clock. He missed the shot. That doesn't mean it was a bad shot or an indication of a particular masculine failing. With Brandon Roy out, the Blazers are willing -- to a point-- to live-and-die on Aldridge jumpers. They've got other choices but not a lot of them and certainly none that are guaranteed to produce more effectively down the stretch.
To illustrate that point, we need look only at the very next possession. Here's a photo. After the missed jumper, McMillan decided to go away from the pick and roll and attack Iverson in a different way: post him up with Andre Miller. As discussed recently, Miller in the post has been one of the Blazers newest, most effective weapons. Miller has everything you want in a posting up guard: a big body, a great ability to read defenses, and a full assortment of post moves, many of which succeed in drawing fouls. Get this: over the last 9 games, Miller is averaging a remarkable 1.50 points per possession every single time he enters the post. The Blazers are scoring at least one point on 74.2% percent of those possessions. That's as close to automatic as you can reasonably expect in the NBA. But it doesn't come without some risk.
McMillan's decision to go to the post, particularly against Iverson, was very sound. As you can see in the picture, the defense is quick to respect Miller's post up ability, doubling down quickly and paying extra attention from the weak side. Unfortunately, Miller made the wrong read, attempting to force the ball to Rudy Fernandez rather than make the simple kick-out to Jerryd Bayless. The result was a turnover. Here you would like to see better spacing from the Blazers so that reading the defense would be easier. You'd also maybe like to see a kickout to Bayless and then a re-post, if possible, to force Philly's defense (particularly its guards) to work through a full shot clock, something they've shown an unwillingness to do on recent possessions. While you hate to see turnovers, especially late in a close game, the fact that Miller is operating out of the post with less than 2 minutes is a great sign. Blazers fans should want to see that as much as possible during Roy's absence. Keep doing it until teams find a way to consistently stop it.
After the turnover, McMIllan returned once again to a high pick and roll with Bayless and Aldridge. Are you seeing a pattern developing here? As long as Bayless is not turning the ball over and remains aggressive attacking the hoop, this is a very potent default offensive look and it is very low-risk. The worst case scenario on Wednesday had proven to be an uncontested jumper from Aldridge. As discussed, that ain't bad.
Here's a look at the last play that I'll break down today. Dalembert again shows hard on Bayless, actively looking to force the ball out of his hands. This time Holiday makes an adjustment, rotating fully as he respects Aldridge's jumper and, perhaps, hopes to intercept a pass.
The result? Here's a look. Bayless makes arguably his best read of the night, throwing a crosscourt skip pass to a wide open Andre Miller. Philly's guards are taken completely out of the play and Elton Brand (power forward) once again finds himself in the unenviable position of checking Miller (point guard) out on the perimeter. Miller licks his lips, drives baseline easily and draws the foul. Easy points thanks to the perfect read from Bayless and the instant recognition from Miller. Philly was out of potential adjustments and that was that.
Conclusions
As I focused on the breakdowns against Cleveland, I decided to mostly highlight the successes against Philadelphia. There was plenty to like: Bayless's aggressiveness and reads, Aldridge's pick-setting, active involvement and shooting touch, Miller's recognition of mismatches, quick passing and foul drawing abilities. Add it all up and the Blazers won the final quarter 27-22.
On the flip side, it's important to remember that the Blazers were having their way with a below-average defense and were exploiting a pretty obvious hole (Allen Iverson). Much of what the Blazers were doing with the high pick and rolls might have been limited or eliminated by a team that had a better on-ball defender guarding Bayless or a team that maintained its overall defensive structure well enough that it didn't feel the need to chase Bayless with a 7 foot center out at the 3 point line. Much harder tests -- especially Boston tonight -- are on the horizon.
If there's a major takeaway from the fourth quarter stretch in Philly it is this: the new-found versatility on offense in Roy's absence adds significant value in and of itself. As the Blazers tinkered with different looks, Philly was forced to adjust to the Blazers time and again. These adjustments led to new holes to exploit. When the Blazers struggled, they were able to return to their bread-and-butter -- the high pick and roll-- and attack a Philly defense that hadn't had enough time to truly figure it out. The end result was a well-balanced, pretty effective attack. With the exception of Rudy's pass to Aldridge it wasn't necessarily pretty. But it was, in the end, a much-needed road win.
-- Ben Golliver | benjamin.golliver@gmail.com | Twitter
PS You can follow the Invisible Ninja (the source of so many awesome stats and tendencies, like the ones mentioned above) on Twitter here.
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Love these Ben.. great work..
more X’s and O’s please.
RoadBlazer
Agreed. More like this please.
The “7 seconds or mess” breakdowns are the cream of the crop, but this is really good too.
Outstanding work Ben.
Not only are you increasing my knowledge and understanding of the game, I like how you are provided what I think is a much needed insight into how coaches think.
In the on-going discussions about Nate’s suitability as a coach, one theme that is becoming apparent to me is the similarity to playing poker. Where some people see McMillan as being over conservative and risk adverse, I see him as understanding what the percentages are and evaluating what is happening on the court in that light. He can’t do much about execution, but he can try to put his players into a position with the highest probability of succeeding.
Clarence, It's better to have a gun and not need it, then need a gun and not have it.
by timg56 on Jan 22, 2010 1:44 PM PST reply actions 1 recs
A lot of the complaints against Nate focus on how quickly those sets are executed
Against a weak defensive team, you can score a winning percentage of the time once everyone is set. It’s a “my offensive set is better than your defensive set” theme.
However, it doesn’t take many missed shots to show that limiting your opportunities (slowly developing sets) can backfire – especially against a better defensive team that can force one or two extra misses.
Therein lies the fallacy of a deliberate pace at the end of games. Shots are precious, high percentage shots are priceless. Good defenses don’t give up high percentage shots on slowly developing sets. If you only have half the shot clock to work with, you must have an iso and take your chances with Roy beating a guy one on one.
Far better is to push the ball up and get into a quick developing set that has a better chance of forcing a mismatch. A shot earlier in the clock off mismatches isn’t the same as a Phoenix fast break – but it is a high-paced activity with the potential for a high-percentage shot. Portland has shown flashes of this, but has never been able to execute on a regular basis.
I believe it is possible to verify this admitted opinion by examining Aldridge’s stats. Adjusting for fast break points, I’d bet that Aldridge scores off shots closer to the basket more often early in the shot clock than late. Synergy could probably verify the veracity of this hypotheses.
by blacknoiseNW on Jan 22, 2010 2:00 PM PST up reply actions
And the fallacy in the nate criticism is the failure to understand ...
… exactly what it is he’s telling his players.
He constantly is calling for them to push the pace when the opportunities are there, in order to beat the defense before it sets up. We have also seen him in timeouts telling his guys to take the open shot when they have it. I’ve watched as he’s told the team that and then seen them continue to pass on a shot in order to maybe get someone else a better look.
That Nate teaches ball control, high percentage shot selection and mistake free basketball is not the same as saying he doesn’t believe in picking up the pace. I believe he does. He just doesn’t want the team to do so at the expense of the other requirements. And he’s correct. Playing at a faster pace doesn’t mean you can’t play the percentages or can’t take care of the ball. It is all about recognition and execution on the part of the players. First get them able to execute at a slower pace. Then once it becomes second nature to them, they can pick up the pace and still play good basketball.
I believe Nate is doing exactly what a we would want with a young team – developing a solid foundation and getting them to buy into the concept of team verse individual accomplishment. The price may be fewer SportsCenter highlights and players with per game averages lower than what they might be on another team, but the payoff is consistent long term success.
Clarence, It's better to have a gun and not need it, then need a gun and not have it.
The fallacy in your argument is that they play what they practice
as a coach of mine used to preach – practices doesn’t make perfect – practice makes permanent. Nate may understand the need for a faster pace, but he doesn’t know how to coach it.
Nate’s offense was exposed last season by Houston. You have to be able to take advantage of defenses, and you can’t do that if you are susceptible to being outplayed. Slow deliberate offenses can be schemed against – and those schemes are most effective in crunch time.
by blacknoiseNW on Jan 23, 2010 12:26 AM PST up reply actions
You might have a point ....
…. if you had a clue as to what Portland does in their practices. Seeing how they are closed to the media, the only way you would know is if you are a regular guest of the team when they do practice, or perhaps get together regularly with a member of the team and discuss it.
The only real fallacy in my argument was in trying to discuss the subject with someone who believes he knows more that he does.
I also love how you can pick the playoff series against Houston as proof that you know what you are talking about. Portland lost that series and according to you the reason they did so was obvious – Nate’s simple offensive game plan and deliberate, slow pace prevented the team from beating the Rockets. That would be a good proof, if it was actually the case. But for it to be the case, one has to throw out every other factor at play during the series, including the fact that Portland was not all that far away from winning it. Good execution in a couple of key spots may have been all the difference needed to swing a game. And it must be beyond doubt that being the youngest team in the league, making the playoffs for the first time after exceeding everyone’s expectations during the regular season had zero impact or effect.
Here is the thing about all the critics who believe they have a better grasp of NBA game strategy than McMillan – they can’t come up with much in the way of numbers and results to back up their case. Those are far more supportive of the case that McMillan can coach and is doing a very good job of it. Saying he can’t because his young team lost their first playoff series against a team that was a poor matchup for them in any case conveniently ignores the excellent level of coaching that was required to get that team into the playoffs in the first place.
Clarence, It's better to have a gun and not need it, then need a gun and not have it.
Agreed with everyone else
Great work Ben. Outstanding. Like timg, this kind of stuff even helps me to appreciate what Coach Nate is doing a bit more, and understanding the enviable problem he has of what to do with so many offensive weapons at his disposal.
Now if we only had good audio to here the play calls as they are made by Nate and/or the players on the court.
I would love to compare what the play calls are with what and how it is executed…Certainly their is a lot of instinct by the players to make the right reads and calls especially to an adjusting defense.
Great read, Ben!
Try that on Boston
Nice analysis Ben. Boston will eat us alive if we try to rely on one or two options.
I’m not a huge fan of Nate calling every play- especially down the stretch. Too much time off the shot clock and defense gets to set up. But he seems to be finding decent mismatches, so what do I know?
Wisdom of the masses.
You know more than you think.
by blacknoiseNW on Jan 22, 2010 2:02 PM PST up reply actions
What I notice about Philly’s defense in each of the captures is that they are scrambling even before we attack. All Bayless has to do is dribble around the screen, and their defenders have already committed, allowing him to make the read while the spacing is still relatively even, and from a pretty static position on the outside where it’s easier to survey the floor. Better defensive teams won’t commit to their rotations until the ballhandler commits to how he’s going to attack. At that point, they can rotate knowing that it’s much more difficult for a player who’s moving toward the basket to make the proper read. So this was a good performance from Bayless, but as Ben says “tougher tests lie ahead.”
That was awesome
You should do more of these Ben, maybe make it a semi regular feature? It really helped my understanding of the Blazers offense
Call Brandon Roy by his real nicknames: The Natural and Roybot. Lets put an end to "B-Roy"
Of Nate's shortcomings, I have not usually included his offense.
I tend to like it. I don’t like Roy on five however. Nate gets my vote when he utilizes all his weapons and sees which ones are firing and have them in at the end on a game by game basis. This year he’s been doing that for the most part. Nate is improving as a coach and I’m loving it. As I’ve said before, his first real test will be when he has a full a full compliment of players too choose from again and see if he reverts back to old bad habits or uses his new improved game/player management skills to optimum effect.
by Emperor_Doom on Jan 22, 2010 2:44 PM PST reply actions
Awesome work Ben
Well done. Love this stuff.
Q: Is Greg favoring his knee?
Frye: He favors dunking on your head, that's what he favors.
Good stuff
The key to this set was Rudy taking his smoke break in the corner.
http://twitpic.com/z8lts/full
"The trouble with the world is that the stupid are cocksure and the intelligent are full of doubt." -- Bertrand Russell
Lovin' my Meat & Potatoes
Basic meat and potatoes is one of my favorites.
Thanks Ben, that was yummy.
Bayless is learning quick – at both ends of the floor.
{I also like how Miller morphed The Portland into a Driving Mismatch Opportunity}
VERY glad to see the Bayless floater. I like the term tear-drop, and its a great shot for Bayless to use to pull a few bricks out of those walls he likes to fly into, by drawing out the defenders so they can’t just wait on a block. Who’s teaching him, Blake or Miller or _? or, did he always have that sitting in the back of the tool box? To my view, its a game changer for him to pair it with his attacking the rim.
Ben, can you look into the background behind the Bayless tear-drop?
That was like a poem
It was beautiful, man.
#52 by Mortimer on Dec 17, 2009 10:35 PM PST

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